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Illegitimacy and Equal Protection: Two Tiers or An
Analytical Grab-Bag?
There are no illegitimate children . . .only illegitimate parents.
This spirited maxim, uttered almost half a century ago when
illegitimate children still had few legal rights, now has the ring of
indisputable folk wisdom. Few would disagree, in this enlightened
era, that it is unjust to penalize children born out of wedlock for the
acts of their parents.' Nor would many oppose the use of that maxim
as a fundamental guide for making laws affecting the rights of such
children.' But the law is necessarily more complex than folk wisdom, for the rights of one person imply liabilities in another. Thus,
despite a clearly discernible movement improving the legal status
of those born illegitimate, substantial pockets of uncertainty still
remain in this area of the law.
No small part of this remaining uncertainty can be traced to
confusion in the methodology of the equal protection clause. Ironically, the manner in which the equal protection clause has been
used by the United States Supreme Court to advance the rights of
illegitimates has caused much of that confusion which now threatens to frustrate further clarification of those rights. It is the task of
this comment to examine the interaction between those deceptively
simple words in the fourteenth amendment ("No State shall . .
deny to any person . . .the equal protection of the laws" 4 ) and
the law affecting illegitimates. Review of Supreme Court decisions
relating to illegitimacy demonstrates how the desire to extend
constitutional protection to illegitimates helped to generate the
current instability of equal protection analysis; in turn, recent
Illinois decisions-in particular, In re Estate of Karas l -illustrate
the difficulty which state and lower federal courts have in clarifying
and extending that protection due to the unstable condition of the
analytical technique.
1. This well-known quotation has been attributed to Judge Leon Yankwich, speaking in
a 1928 Los Angeles County Superior Court case. Comment, 47 NOTRE DAME LAW. 392, 403
(1971).
2. In a survey taken among Illinois families in 1968, 96 per cent of respondents agreed that
the law should not disadvantage the illegitimate child for the misdeeds of its parents; 95 per
cent agreed that the child should have the same legal relationship with the mother as a
legitimate child; 78 per cent that it should have the same right to support from the father;
and 64 per cent that it should have full inheritance rights from the father. H. KRAUSE,
ILLEGITIMACY: LAW AND SOCIAL POLICY 161-62, 166-74 (1971) [hereinafter cited as KRAUSE].
3. Id.
4. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, section 1.
5. 61 Ill. 2d 40, 329 N.E.2d 234 (1975).
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BACKGROUND: THE RIGHTS OF ILLEGITIMATES AND EQUAL PROTECTION
ANALYSIS BEFORE 1968

The relationship between the rights of illegitimates and the equal
protection clause before 1968 is easy to state: there was none.6 At
common law, and in the early years of this country, the lot of the
illegitimate child was a harsh one. Socially he was the object of
scorn, while legally he was nullius filius, the child of nobody.7 Without parents in the eyes of the law, it followed that the child had no
claim to support by nor any right to inherit from his natural parents.' But a society which in principle eliminated aristocracy-bybirth had some difficulty digesting the converse notion that certain
infants are, by law, inferior to others. Moreover-and no doubt a
more cogent concern than theoretical purity-the unpleasant effects
of the industrial revolution in crowded cities stimulated fears that
the care of illegitimates might become too great a burden on state
governments.' Thus, over the past century, states have enacted legislation which, by giving more rights to illegitimates against their
parents (especially mothers), have gradually ameliorated the
harsher aspects of the common law.'" A few states, in fact, have
largely eliminated any legal distinction between legitimate and illegitimate children." But in most, including Illinois, certain substantial burdens have remained. 2
Until recent years the United States Supreme Court did little
more than affirm the power of state legislatures to modify the com6. Krause, Equal Protectionfor the Illegitimate, 65 MIcH. L. REV. 477 (1967) [hereinafter
cited as Equal Protectionfor the Illegitimate].
7. Id. A number of reasons have been offered to explain the historical basis for the legal
disabilities inflicted on illegitimates. These have included church and state cooperation to
discourage immorality and strengthen the family unit, and the motivation of fathers to
protect feudal lands from claims asserted by unwanted offspring. Professor Krause has observed that it is hardly to be unexpected that men, as legislators, would have limited the
possibility of claims against them by their accidental offspring. Id. at 499. See also the
discussion of laws discriminating against illegitimates in KRAUSE, supra note 2, at 1-7.
8. Comment, 47 NOTRE DAME LAW. 392 (1971).
9. Historically, the paternity action has been treated as one primarily for the benefit of
the public, with the good of the child as something of an afterthought. See KRAUSE, supra
note 2, at 83-84, 106.
10. Id. at 9.
11. Arizona, North Dakota and Oregon have eliminated all formal requirements of acknowledgment or legitimation for purposes of inheritance. Comment, 47 NOTRE DAME LAW.
392 (1971). See, e.g., ARMz. REV. STAT. ANN., § 14-2109(2)(1974), which provides that a child
born out of wedlock may inherit from its natural father if, inter alia, paternity is established
after the death of the father by "clear and convincing proof."
12. Even within one jurisdiction, the law [with respect to illegitimacy] rarely
is consistent or clear. More often than not, it is an uncertain mixture of ancient
English common law tempered with occasional flashes of modem thought . ...
KRAUSE, supra note 2, at 6.
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mon law on this subject.'3 However, in 1968, in Levy v. Louisiana"
and Glona v. American Guaranteeand Liability Ins. Co.," the Court
first applied the strictures of the equal protection clause to the
status of illegitimacy and found it to be in need of constitutional
protection. A series of related decisions followed in the next six
years.
Rarely invoked in the first decades of its existence, the equal
protection clause was described by Justice Holmes in 1927 as "the
usual last resort of constitutional arguments."'" At a time when the
substantive view of due process led the Court into iron-fisted activism against welfare-state legislation, it settled on a deferential approach to equal protection which has generally been known as the
"rational basis" or "reasonable basis" standard.' 7 This traditional
standard of review, which is still viable as a means of insulating the
Court from requests to invalidate state regulation of such matters
as business and taxation," was articulated by Chief Justice Warren
in McGowan v. Maryland:"
The constitutional safeguard is offended only if the classification
rests on grounds wholly irrelevant to the achievement of the State's
objective. . . .A statutory discrimination will not be set aside if
any state of facts reasonably may be conceived to justify it."
So stated, the traditional rational basis test is highly permissive
towards state legislation. It requires such minimal scrutiny of challenged statutes that it has been said to result in "total abdication
2
of judicial review." '
However, the Court subsequently developed a second standard of
equal protection review for those situations in which the discriminatory classification either threatens a fundamental constitutional
right-such as the right to procreate, 2 the right to vote 3 or the right
13. See, e.g., Cope v. Cope, 137 U.S. 682 (1891), which upheld a state intestate succession
statute which permitted an illegitimate to inherit from its father.
14. 391 U.S. 68 (1968), reh. denied 393 U.S. 898 (1968).

15.
16.

391 U.S. 73 (1968), reh. denied 393 U.S. 898 (1968).
Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 208 (1927).

17. See Note, The Less Restrictive Alternative in ConstitutionalAdjudication: An
Analysis, A Justification, and Some Criteria, 27 VAND. L. REV. 971, 995 (1974) [hereinafter
cited as The Less Restrictive Alternative].
18. See, e.g., Lehnhausen v. Lake Shore Auto Parts Co., 410 U.S. 356 (1973); Dandridge
v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970); San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411
U.S. 1 (1973).
19. 366 U.S. 420 (1961).
20. Id. at 425-26.
21. The Less Restrictive Alternative, supra note 17, at 996.
22. Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
23. Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
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to travel among the states 2 4-or involves a suspect classification-race,2 5 ancestry" or alienage. 7 Under these circumstances the
Court will evaluate the legislation not under the reasonable basis
test but with "strict scrutiny," which requires the Court to rigorously analyze the necessity of the classificatory scheme as a means
of accomplishing a compelling state interest.2 8 One particularly
powerful tool in the strict scrutiny approach-from the standpoint
of those challenging a statutory classification-is consideration of
less restrictive alternatives, which has no place in the rational basis
test. 9 The requirement of necessity in the strict scrutiny standard
means that legislation will be invalidated if the Court can conceive
of an alternative legislative scheme which would further the intended purpose in a manner less burdensome to the class of persons
afflicted by the classification under review. 0
During the Warren Court years, these methods of equal protection
analysis became solidified into the"two-tiered" approach, an apparently simple, easily-comprehended methodology for handling
equal protection challenges. Indeed, although there might be difficult questions as to the existence of a fundamental right or a suspect
classification, the bare methodology is simple: if a fundamental
right or a suspect classification is involved, use strict scrutiny; if
not, use the rational basis test. Moreover, in most cases the inquiry
could be short-circuited: if a fundamental right or a suspect classification is involved, invalidate; if not, do not invalidate.'
Despite this appealing simplicity (some commentators, emphasizing the infinite complexity in the affairs of men, would say
because of this simplicity2 ) the two-tiered method has contained
24. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 629-31 (1969).
25. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964);
Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
26. Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633 (1948); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214
(1944).
27. In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717 (1973); Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634 (1973); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971).
28. See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969); San Antonio Independent School
Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1973).
29. See The Less Restrictive Alternative, supra note 17, at 995-99.
30. Id. at 999.
31. The result-selecting aspect of the two-tiered method has been a source of dissatisfaction. See Note, The Emerging Bifurcated Standard for Classifications Based on Sex, 1975
DUKE L.J. 163, 165 (1975): "In marked contrast to the extremely slight risk of judicial disapproval under the traditional standard, application of strict scrutiny results in almost automatic invalidation."
32. See Justice Marshall's dissent in San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez,
411 U.S. 1, 98 (1973), criticizing the majority position that "equal protection cases fall into
one of two neat categories ..
"
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enormous tension. It can easily handle the extremes. After the excesses of substantive due process, judicial deference to legislative
regulation of business matters is a widely-accepted stance."3 There
is also wide agreement that statutes which make racial classifications or threaten fundamental constitutional rights should be permissible only if supported by the most compelling justification."
But a quandary arises when the Court is confronted with matters
which fall somewhere between those extremes. Simple deference to
the legislative will under the traditional rational basis test can appear to offend common notions of justice where, for example, the
right threatened is a personal right which, while not protected by

the Bill of Rights, is vital to a decent standard of living; or where
the classification, while not suspect under judicial precedent, seems
to possess the general attributes of a suspect classification.

It has been suggested that the Supreme Court move to outright
balancing of interests," to graduated levels of review"5 or to stronger
forms of the rational basis test.37 The Court has not granted its
explicit imprimaturto any of these methods. Nevertheless, the two33. See discussion of judicial self-restraint in A. Cox, THE WARREN COURT 3-4, 9 (1968)
[hereinafter cited as Cox]. See also A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH (1962)
[hereinafter cited as BICKEL], who observes that, in the political process,
There are some conceivable groupings of victors and losers which we do not recognize as legitimate. . . .But as to farmers, fishermen, truckers, billboard advertisers, and other economic groups, the legislature may simply make discriminatory
choices . ..
Id. at 226-27.
34. Disagreement among the Justices as to particular applicability of strict scrutiny turns
not on the basic concept of strict scrutiny but on what groups should be considered suspect
and what rights should be considered fundamental. See generally the majority and dissenting
opinions in San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
35. Balancing "tests" for equal protection review seem to be the favored remedy of commentators. See Wilkinson, The Supreme Court, the Equal Protection Clause and the Three
Faces of ConstitutionalEquality, 61 VA. L. REV. 945, 985 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Wilkinson]; Shaman, The Rule of Reasonableness in ConstitutionalAdjudication, 2 HAST. CONST.
L.Q. 153, 174 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Shaman]; The Less Restrictive Alternative, supra
note 17, at 1023.
36. Justice Marshall has proposed a "sliding scale" approach to the importance of rights
threatened by a classification in his dissents to Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 519-21
(1970); Richardson v. Belcher, 404 U.S. 78, 90 (1971); and San Antonio Independent School
Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 70 (1973). Under his suggested approach, the appropriate
degree of scrutiny would be applied based upon the constitutional and societal importance
of the individual interests and/or the invidiousness of the classification; the proper level of
review would be applied to the substantiality of the state's interest, the reasonableness of the
means adopted and the availability of alternatives. See The Less Restrictive Alternative,
supra note 17, at 1006.
37. Gunther, The Supreme Court 1971 Term, Forward: In Search of Evolving Doctrine
on a Changing Court: A Model for Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 21 (1972)
[hereinafter cited as Gunther].
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tiered method, with its "all or nothing approach," 3 could not stand
untarnished for long. As the Supreme Court's illegitimacy decisions
illustrate, it has not.
ILLEGITIMACY DECISIONS IN THE SUPREME COURT:

Sub Rosa

DISMANTLING OF THE Two-TIERED STANDARD?

The first decisions applying the equal protection clause to classifications based on legitimacy appeared to signal a significant change
in emphasis in the reasonable basis test. In Levy v. Louisiana" the
Court invalidated a Louisiana statute which authorized a wrongful
death action by legitimate children for the death of the mother but
withheld such right of action from illegitimate children. In the companion case, Glona v. American Guaranteeand Liability Ins. Co., 0
that part of the same statute which prohibited an action by the
mother for the death of her illegitimate child was also held unconstitutional.
Although the theoretical basis of these decisions was not made
entirely clear-certain language came close to characterizing illegitimacy as a suspect classification 4 -the Court appeared to rely on
a rephrasing of the reasonable basis test into mandatory language:
that the equal protection clause requires at a minimum that the
statutory classification bear some rational relationship to a legitimate state purpose. It was asserted that Louisiana had a valid interest in discouraging promiscuity and illegitimacy.42 The Court did
not quarrel with the validity of these purposes, and under the traditional, permissive phrasing of the rational basis test, it might well
have refused to question the tenuous connection between ends and
means. But in Glona the Court did analyze the relationship of
means to ends-albeit in rather summary fashion-and held that
there could be "no possible rational basis for assuming that the
cause of illegitimacy will be served"43 should a mother be allowed
to recover for the wrongful death of her illegitimate child. Underly38. Wilkinson, supra note 35, at 1017.
39. 391 U.S. 68 (1968).
40. 391 U.S. 73 (1968).
41. The majority opinion by Justice Douglas described discrimination against illegitimates as "invidious ...
when no action, conduct, or demeanor of theirs is possibly relevant
to the harm that was done the mother." Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68, 72 (1968).
42. Id. at 75.
43. Id. Professor Krause, labelling the family-protection purpose a "tired concern," has
resurrected an eighth century description by Saint Boniface of the English, "both Christians
and pagans," as "refusing to have legitimate wives and continuing to live in lechery and
adultery after the manner of neighing horses and braying asses ..
" Krause, Bastard Finds
His Father,3 FAM. L. Q. 100, 110 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Bastard Finds His Father].
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ing this conclusion was an unspoken but unassailable premise: that
it is absurd to contend that people adjust their sexual conduct according to the availability of a wrongful death remedy in the unlikely event that a child resulting from an illicit union should be
killed. Sensible people do not guide their actions on the basis of such
compounded, distant improbabilities.
Following these ground-breaking decisions, the Court appeared to
take a giant stride in the opposite direction, not only in terms of the
substantive rights of illegitimates, but also in the standard of equal
protection review. In Labine v. Vincent," two new members joined
the three Levy-Glona dissenters" to uphold a provision of Louisiana's intestate succession statute which did not permit an illegitimate child to inherit from its father even though the father had
formally acknowledged the child as his own. The plurality opinion
by Justice Black reasserted a policy of virtually total deference to
state legislation, emphasizing that "the choices reflected by the
intestate succession statute are choices which it is within the power
of the State to make." 4 In a curious footnote, the opinion asserted
that "even if we were to apply the 'rational basis' test, that statute
clearly has a rational basis in view of Louisiana's interest in promoting family life and of directing disposition of property left within the
state."4 7
Thus Labine suggested two wrinkles, one old and one new. In the
footnote dictum it eschewed the strengthened rational basis test of
Levy and Glona by allowing to pass unscathed an asserted connection between discriminating against illegitimates and protection of
family life. In addition, the footnote, because it indicated that the
Court was not using any form of the rational basis test, could be
read as implying the emergence of a new, less-than-rational basis
test, one reaching new extremes of permissiveness toward state legislation. The opinion appeared to say that the Court would refuse
to review discriminatory legislation under the equal protection
clause so long as the area of law-e.g., probate administration-were one which is within the power of the state to regulate."
Justice Brennan's dissent showed clearly the failure of logic in such
a position, at least if the equal protection clause were not to be
44.
45.
Black
46.
47.
48.

401 U.S. 532 (1971), reh. denied 402 U.S. 990 (1972).
The two new members, Justices Burger and Blackmun, joined Justices Stewart and
in the plurality opinion, with Justice Harlan concurring. Id.
Id. at 537.
Id. at 536n.6.
Labine v. Vincent, 401 U.S. 532, 536 (1971).
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rendered a nullity."
Subsequent decisions made Labine seem more an aberration than
a sturdy explication of equal protection theory. In Weber v. Aetna
Casualty & Surety Co.,'0 Justice Powell spoke for eight members'
and invalidated a Louisiana workmen's compensation provision
denying a dependent, unacknowledged illegitimate child the right
to recover for the death of the father on an equal basis with the
decedent's legitimate children. The opinion hinted at the possibility
that the Court would use an explicit balancing process in equal
protection cases:
The essential inquiry . . . is . . . inevitably a dual one: What
legitimate state interests does the classification promote? What
2
fundamental personal rights might the classification endanger?
Despite this language, no clear balancing process was performed in
the decision. Rather, the Court again seemed to rely on the strengthened rational basis test, with some degree of scrutiny directed toward the relationship of means to ends. While granting the validity
of a state interest in promoting legitimate family relationships, it
refused to accept the notion that this purpose would be served by
the statute: "[P]ersons will [not] shun illicit relations because the
offspring may not one day reap the benefits of workmen's compensa53
tion."1
Thus, although the decision made no mention of any change
in equal protection analysis, the Court in fact seemed to be applying
again what Professor Gunther termed "rationality scrutiny," a
somewhat more stringent mutation of the traditional test."'
5 and New
Two 1973 decisions, Gomez v. Perez"
Jersey Welfare
Rights Organizationv. Cahill," expanded still further the rights of
illegitimates but offered no clarification of the applicable mode of
equal protection analysis. In Gomez the Court held unconstitutional
a Texas law which granted legitimate children an enforceable right
to support from their natural fathers while completely denying that
right to illegitimate children. In the New Jersey Welfare Rights case
49. But no one questions Louisiana's power to pass inheritance laws. Surely the
Court cannot be saying that the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause
is inapplicable to subjects regulable by the States-that extraordinary proposition
would reverse a century of constitutional adjudication. ...
Id. at 548-49.
50. 406 U.S. 164 (1972).
51. Only Justice Rehnquist dissented. Id. at 177.
52. Id. at 173.
53. Id.
54. Gunther, supra note 37.
55. 409 U.S. 535 (1973).
56. 411 U.S. 619 (1973).
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it invalidated a state scheme of welfare assistance for the working
poor which limited benefits to only those families in a household of
two ceremonially-married adults and at least one legitimate child.
In practical effect, therefore, assistance was denied to most illegiti57
mate children.
Neither decision specified the equal protection test used. Both
appeared to be predicated on the simple principle that it is "illogical
and unjust"5 to discriminate against illegitimate children, and on
the unsupported assertion that Levy, Glona and Weber "compel the
conclusion" that the respective classifications were invalid."'
Analysis of the opinion in Gomez raises particular problems about
the state of equal protection review. The Texas no-right-to-support
statute apparently was defended as a response to the difficulties of
proof which attend the establishment of a paternal relationship.'
Preventing fraudulent paternity suits is certainly a valid state purpose, and it would be difficult to contend that denying the right to
support does not substantially further that goal. Thus, under either
the traditional or the strengthened rational basis test, the Texas
statute, in theory, should have been upheld. The Court,
faced with the fraud-prevention interest, stated in a per curiam
opinion that "lurking problems with respect to proof of paternity
. . . are not to be lightly brushed aside, but neither can they be
made into an impenetrable barrier that works to shield otherwise
invidious discrimination."'" This language suggests that the Gomez
court was indeed balancing the relative importance of the state
interest against the character of the discrimination caused by the
classification-clearly a process beyond the ken of either form of the
rational basis test. It would appear, therefore, that this unsigned
opinion was using still another but unarticulated method of constitutional review.
Emergence of a potpourri of available analytical tools under the
aegis of the equal protection clause was not arrested by the Court's
most recent pronouncement on the rights of illegitimates, Jiminez
2
v. Weinberger."
Refurbishing an old due process concept, disapproval of conclusive or irrebuttable presumptions," the majority
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
(1975).

Id. at 621.
Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535, 538 (1973).
New Jersey Welfare Rights Organization v. Cahill, 411 U.S. 619, 621 (1973).
Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535, 538 (1973).
Id.
417 U.S. 628 (1974).
See Note, Irrebuttable Presumptions: An Illusory Analysis, 27 STAN. L. REV. 449
The conclusive presumption analysis has also been applied in a due process context

19761

Illegitimacy and Equal Protection

invalidated an intricate Social Security provision which, for the
purpose of minimizing spurious claims, conclusively denied benefits
to certain categories of illegitimate children born after the onset of
the natural father's disability. Looking askance at the irrebuttable
presumption that these illegitimates, because of the time of their
birth, were not dependant on the claimant, 4 the Court delved into
the relationship of means to ends with a rigor difficult to distinguish
from strict scrutiny. The Court observed that even if it is easier to
fabricate evidence of parentage or support after the beginning of the
disability, the potential for spurious claims would be exactly the
same for both qualifying and non-qualifying afterborn illegitimates. 5 The Court also took cognizance of the fact that the classification was both overinclusive-though intended to reach only truly
dependent children, it included some who were not actually dependent",-and underinclusive, because it conclusively excluded some
children who in fact were dependent." Despite this intense inquiry
akin to strict scrutiny, the Court never explicity invoked that standard; indeed, it stated that it was unnecessary to reach the question
whether classifications based upon legitimacy of birth are suspect.,
The cumulative impact of the decisions from Levy to Jiminez
leaves some points clear, others less than clear. Without doubt the
Constitution no longer permits the state to indulge in discrimination against illegitimates as an end in itself. Official support for the
social revulsion often visited upon the illegitimate child is an invalid
purpose under any standard of review. But the extent to which
discrimination may be imposed as a means of accomplishing a valid
state objective is the germane and more intricate question.
Few problems are presented now by the relationship between
mother and illegitimate child. In most states, including Illinois,
illegitimates have for some time inherited from the mother on an
equal footing with her legitimate children. 9 Levy and Glona explicitly, and other Supreme Court decisions by implication, eliminated
most other vestiges of past discrimination with respect to the
mother. The relative ease which the legislatures and courts have
in Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441 (1973) and Cleveland Bd. of Education v. LaFleur, 414 U.S.
632 (1974).
64. Jiminez v. Weinberger, 417 U.S. 628 (1974).
65. Id.at 636.
66. Id. at 637.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 631-32.
69. KRAUSE, supra note 2, at 25-26. See also Comment, 47 NOTRE DAME LAW. 392, 398-99
(1971).
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experienced in firming the legal bonds between illegitimate and
mother has been attributed to either a presumed special affinity
between mother and child or to the fact that questions as to proof
of parenthood are seldom raised.7 The thornier issue involves the
rights of the illegitimate child with respect to the natural father.72
While Weber and Gomez cut sharply into the old barriers which
shielded the father from responsibility for the consequences of his
actions, continued uncertainty over the importance of the proof
problem leaves many questions unresolved.
If there are gray areas in delineating the substantive rights of
illegitimates, the current status of equal protection analysis is even
more obscure. In San Antonio Independent School District v.
Rodriguez,7 3 the Supreme Court reasserted adherence to the twotiered approach." Yet analysis of the illegitimacy decisions discloses
the use, before and since Rodriguez, of at least three identifiable
standards of review which are supposedly less intensive than strict
scrutiny:
(1) The traditional rational basis test is the line of least constitutional resistance to state laws. It accords maximum latitude to
state legislation by accepting any explanation for a discriminatory
classification which from a cursory look is not "wholly irrational".
(2) The "strengthened" rational basis test, in form, is merely a
rephrasing of the traditional test from permissive into mandatory
language. It requires examination of the rationality in fact of the
classification as a means to an end and will not let merely fanciful
explanations pass.
(3) A strongly heightened but nevertheless uncertain level of
scrutiny will be applied where the Court finds that a conclusive
presumption is involved. Apparently analysis of over-inclusiveness,
under-inclusiveness and the availability of less onerous means may
be utilized. To these standards we might add a fourth approach
where their application fails to accomplish the proper result: a balancing or weighing of the interests as in Gomez.
It should also be noted that it is not solely the area of illegitimacy
which has placed such strain on the two-tiered method. Although
the proponents of suspect status for sex classifications have been
70. See Baston v. Sears, 15 Ohio St. 2d 166, 239 N.E.2d 62 (1968), which for this reason
denied the applicability of Levy to the question of support rights against the father.
71. Margolin, Family Law: The Rights of Illegitimates, 1973/74 ANN. SURV. AMER. L. 23334 (1974). See also Bastard Finds His Father,supra note 43.
72. See KRAUSE, supra note 2, at 72-73.
73. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
74. Id. at 16-17.
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unable to muster a majority, " the Court has applied some unspecified stricter standard of review than that required by either version
of the rational basis test and has invalidated classifications which
work to the disadvantage of women.7" However, sex classifications
which can be characterized as ameliorative in favor of women have
been readily upheld.77
Thus, a proliferation of less-than-strict standards of review has
occurred in recent years. Moreover, even within the ostensibly unitary strict scrutiny approach, it has been observed that there are
"angels and archangels," with race qualifying as a "super-suspect"
class which may call forth not only strict scrutiny but also difficult
and unpopular remedial measures to overcome the effects of past
discrimination." The net effect is a grab-bag of different levels of
review.
Although the disintegration of the two-tiered method might be
applauded as a necessary response to the need for greater flexibility
in equal protection review, several serious drawbacks can be observed. One difficulty which should be noted is that there is still a
large gap between the strengthened rational basis test, in which the
less restrictive alternative is an irrelevant consideration,79 and the
conclusive presumption analysis, which apparently may utilize that
technique.8 0 The strengthened reasonable basis test is adequate to
indicate the folly of some asserted state interests which the traditional test will not challenge, such as the claim that placing extra
burdens on the child born out of wedlock will discourage promiscuity and promote family life.
However, when the relationship involved is that of the illegitimate child to the father, it is not difficult to find a valid purpose
75. Four members of the Court have considered sex to be a suspect classification, at least
in certain circumstances. See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
76. In Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971), for example, an Idaho statute which gave preference to males in appointment of personal representives of estates was invalidated, although
sex was not made a suspect classification. Although the Court ostensibly applied the rational
basis test, it is at least arguable that the classification was rationally connected to the
proffered state interests of avoiding intrafamily controversy and improving estate administration. The decision could have been reached only by using some higher level of scrutiny. See
Note, The Emerging Bifurcated Standard for Classifications Based on Sex, 1975 DUKE L.J.
163, 173.
77. Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351 (1974), in which a special tax advantage available to
widows but not widowers was upheld.
78. Wilkinson, supra note 35, at 978-79.
79. Professor Gunther would, in his means-focused rationality scrutiny, "permit the state
to select any means that substantially furthered the legislative purpose." Gunther, supra note
37, at 21.
80. See text accompanying notes 63 through 68 supra.
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which the classification does, in fact, substantially further. Even if
it exhibits the character of new wine poured into old bottles,8 the
state interest in preventing fraud is certainly a valid one, and it is
difficult to claim that many state restrictions burdening illegitimates do not substantially further this purpose. Such impositions
may go beyond the degree necessary to accomplish the goal of preventing fraud, but a rational basis test, in either form, does not
require that the burden be no more onerous than necessary.82
Thus the strengthened test, because it does not permit consideration of less restrictive alternatives, is not so strengthened after all.
It represents merely a small step in narrowing the wide differential
between traditional and strict levels of review, and therefore does
little to relieve the tension which that gap creates. Application of
the strengthened rational basis test in Labine would not have altered the result, for denial of inheritance from the father could be
viewed as substantially furthering the goal of minimizing fraudulent
assertions of paternity in probate. It is even doubtful that Weber,
if it was in fact decided under this theory,8 3 can be logically supported. Refusal to permit the unacknowledged, illegitimate children
of a disabled father to receive workmen's compensation benefits
could also be seen as rationally connected to the goal of preventing
fraudulent claims. Belated recognition of the theoretical untenability of Weber probably explains why the Gomez court, again faced
with a law bearing on the father-child relationship, used a concealed
balancing approach, for the same result could not have been
reached under the strengthened reasonable basis test.
Perhaps the most serious drawback in the demise of the twotiered system is the fact that the Court is not doing what it purports
to be doing. Nominally it still adheres to the two-tiered approach,"
but in fact it does not always use it. The existence of gradations of
review suggests that the Court is actually engaging in some kind of
balancing process, but beyond its brief flirtation with such an ap81. One expert insists that the basis for discriminatory laws "is found in history, not
reason." Bastard Finds His Father,supra note 43, at 105.
82. See note 79 supra.
83. See text accompanying notes 52 through 54 supra.
84. See text accompanying note 74 supra. One commentator, however, has professed to
see at least some variation from the traditional two-tiered approach within the Rodriguez
opinion, for the Court majority did at least give consideration to what alternative taxing
schemes might have been available to the Texas legislature. The implication drawn is that
even under the lesser standard in the two-tiered approach the Court will at least review
alternatives. Such review of alternatives may even be decisive, but to be so the alternatives
must be widely accepted or clearly practical and effective as well as less restrictive. Note,
The Less Restrictive Alternative, supra note 17, at 1010-11.

19761

Illegitimacy and Equal Protection

proach in Weber it has been unwilling to articulate an explicit balancing test. Moreover, it is extremely difficult to discern the principles, if any, which invoke the different standards of review."5 While
certain situations clearly call forth strict scrutiny, the circumstances in which a court should apply the strengthened rational basis
test or the conclusive presumption approach are uncertain.
EQUAL PROTECTION ANALYSIS IN RECENT ILLINOIS DECISIONS ON THE
RIGHTS OF ILLEGITIMATES

The wide divergence between what is stated to be proper equal
protection analysis and the behavior which can actually be observed
is not conducive to uniform, well-reasoned review by courts which
must attempt to follow the Supreme Court's pronouncements on
constitutional law. This unsettled condition is reflected in two recent Illinois decisions on the rights of illegitimate children with
respect to their fathers. The opinions in these cases illuminate the
fact that true flexibility cannot be achieved until the courts are
provided with some guidance in how to employ the new range of
available tools.
The Illinois Supreme Court, in In re Estate of Karas,11 was presented with a situation virtually identical to that in Labine v.
Vincent. 7 Two appeals were consolidated, both presenting the common issue of the constitutionality of a provision in the Illinois Probate Act which permits an illegitimate child to inherit from an
intestate father only if the child had been acknowledged by the
father and the parents had married each other. In both cases the
petitioning child had been acknowledged, and one had received support from her father. However, in neither instance had the natural
parents intermarried subsequent to the birth of the child; both actions for declaration of heirship were dismissed.8
The petitioners' major contention was that this restriction on the
right of illegitimates to inherit from the father violated the equal
protection and due process clauses of both federal and state constitutions. The court, relying heavily on the factual similarity to
Labine, refused to so hold and affirmed dismissals of both actions.
It held that, as in Labine, the intestate succession scheme created
85. Id. at 1021n.318 (discussing the failure to evolve standards and discipline for application of the conclusive presumption analysis). See also Note, Irrebuttable Presumptions:An
Illusory Analysis, 27 STAN. L. REV. 449, 456 (1975), which observes that "virtually any summarily classifying rule is vulnerable to an irrebuttable presumption challenge."
86. 61 Ill.
2d 40, 329 N.E.2d 234 (1975).
87. 401 U.S. 532 (1971).
88. In re Estate of Karas, 61 111. 2d 40, 43-45, 329 N.E.2d 234, 235-36 (1975).
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by the state legislature was "rationally based" on the state's interest
in encouraging family relationships and in maintaining a sound
method of distributing property of intestates. 9 Emphasis was also
placed on the state's interest in preventing spurious claims against
estates: "While establishing paternity in a proceeding to determine
heirship is possible, situations may arise which are fraught with
fraudulent circumstances." ' 0
The petitioners attempted several routes to circumvent the effect
of Labine. They first argued that the impact of that decision had
been eroded by subsequent Supreme Court decisions. The Illinois
court, however, after reviewing those cases, summarily dismissed
this argument without any explanation why it felt it to be unfounded.' Petitioners also contended that illegitimacy should be
declared a suspect classification, and that laws impinging on the
rights of illegitimates should be strictly scrutinized. The court supported its refusal to do so by observing, first, that only four members
of the Supreme Court have considered sex to be a suspect classification," and, second, that no decision of that court had expressly held
illegitimacy to be a suspect classification. Quoting language of the
Supreme Court asserting that a state "may not impose such greater
restrictions as a matter of federal constitutional law when this Court
• . .specifically refrains from imposing them,"94 the Illinois court
refused to apply strict scrutiny because it would "result in this court
placing strictures on Labine v. Vincent." 5 A further argument for
applying strict scrutiny, that the challenged provision in the Probate Act had evolved into "a thinly disguised cover for racial discrimination" in view of the high statistical correlation between race
and illegitimacy, was rejected on the ground that the section affects
all illegitimates, regardless of race, in the same way, and that "incidental effects" do not make it racially discriminatory.
An ancillary argument raised by petitioners was that the Probate
Act provision violated the Illinois Constitution by denying equal
protection on the basis of sex. The 1974 case of People v. Ellis97 had
89. Id. at 48, 329 N.E.2d at 238.
90. Id. at 52, 329 N.E.2d at 240.
91. Id. at 48-49, 329 N.E.2d at 238-39.
92. Id. at 51, 329 N.E.2d at 239.
93. Id. at 51, 329 N.E.2d at 240.
94. Id. at 53, 329 N.E.2d at 241.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 50, 329 N.E.2d at 239. See text accompanying notes 127 and 128 infra with
respect to an alternative relevance, for purposes of suspect classification categorization, which
the court could have found in these statistics.
97. 57 I1. 2d 127, 311 N.E.2d 98 (1974).
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held that sex is a suspect classification in Illinois in view of the
language of article I, section 18 of the Illinois Constitution, which
states that "equal protection of the laws shall not be denied or
abridged on account of sex." 9" Petitioners contended that the illegitimate child is injured by discriminatory effects inflicted by the
Probate Act on each parent because of his or her sex. The court
dismissed this argument by holding that the petitioners had no right
to assert in their own behalf a violation of someone else's constitutional rights. It noted that the official explanation to article I, Section 18 states that "no government . . . may deny equal protection
of the law to anyone because of his or her sex." 9
The reasoning in a recent Illinois appellate court decision, Cessna
v. Montgomery,'0 which has been appealed to the Illinois Supreme
Court,'"' provides instructive contrast to Karas, not only in the approach to the problem of illegitimacy but also in the manner of
applying the equal protection clause. The plaintiff, mother of an
illegitimate daughter, brought an action to establish paternity-and
therefore liability for support-against the alleged father. The suit
was brought approximately two years and eight months after the
birth of the daughter. The trial court dismissed the action on the
grounds that it was barred by a provision in the Illinois Paternity
Act which disallowed actions to compel support brought more than
two years after either the birth of the child, the date of acknowledgment of paternity (under oath or in court), or the date of the father's
last contribution in support of the child. In this case there had been
neither acknowledgment nor support payments, so the applicable
benchmark for running of the two-year limitation was the date of
birth. 102
The Appellate Court for the Fifth District held that the two-year
limitation denied equal protection to both the illegitimate child and
the mother, under either the rational basis test or what the court
98. ILL. CONST., art. I, § 18.
99. In re Estate of Karas, 61 111. 2d 40, 55, 329 N.E.2d 234, 241 (1975)(emphasis added).
100. 28 Ill.
App. 3d 887, 329 N.E.2d 861 (1975).
101. The Cessna case was consolidated for appeal to the Supreme Court of Illinois with
Malone v. Dunlap (unpublished opinion), in which the Circuit Court of Cook County dismissed a support action because it, like Cessna, was brought more than two years after the
birth of the child. However, Malone v. Dunlap involved the potentially significant additional
facts that the defendant had provided support for the child for over three years and had signed
a witnessed but non-notarized acknowledgment of paternity the day before the child's birth.
The Illinois Supreme Court reversed on the issue of the constitutionality of the two-year
limitation in the Paternity Act. 63 fll.2d 71, 344 N.E.2d 447 (1976).
102. Id.at 889, 329 N.E.2d at 862.
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called "the overinclusive/underinclusive test.' '0 3 In the court's view
the denial of equal protection rested in the fact that there is no time
limit in Illinois law on the right of the mother to compel the natural
father to support his legitimate minor children. Particularly noted
0 in which a mother was permitted to
was the case of Gill v. Gill,'1
bring an action for support against her former husband 15 years
after entry of a divorce decree which contained no order with respect
to child support.
The validity of the objectives of the statutory provision-barring
stale claims, bringing an end to litigation and providing incentive
for the mother to initiate a paternity action early-was readily admitted. There would be no question of constitutionality, said the
court, "were these objectives pursued in a statutory scheme which
limited support actions against all natural fathers of legitimate as
well as illegitimate children."' 05 The court dismissed the concern
that passing time increases the unreliability of proof of paternity by
citing the Gomez language that such difficulties could not justify
erecting "an impenetrable barrier that works to shield otherwise
invidious discrimination."'1 Defendant made the argument that the
two-year limitation reflected a desire to prevent a woman from waiting several years to select whichever of her several "lovers" could
provide the best support. The court responded by noting that the
provision does not include in the two-year period time which the
father spent out of the state; thus it would be possible, even with
the statute as worded, for a woman who had had several lovers who
had moved in and out of the state to engage in the same wait-andselect operation.'0 7
Concluding that the equal protection clause "is not shackled to
the social theories or sexual mores of a particular era,"' ' the court
held that there was no rational relationship between illegitimacy as
a classification and the purposes to be served by such a time limitation on support actions.
ANALYZING THE

Karas AND Cessna OPINIONS:

SUBSTANTIVE

COMPATIBILITY, ANALYTICAL DISCORD

These opinions can be analyzed from at least two angles of in103. Id. at 891, 329 N.E.2d at 863. This apparently was the court's way of describing the
strict scrutiny standard.
104. 8 Ill. App. 3d 625, 290 N.E.2d 897 (1972), aff'd 56 Ill. 2d 139, 306 N.E.2d 281 (1973).
105. Cessna v. Montgomery, 28 Ill. App. 3d 887, 891, 329 N.E.2d 861, 863 (1975).
106. Id. at 893, 329 N.E.2d at 865.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 894, 329 N.E.2d at 865.
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quiry: the substantive aspect-the rights of illegitimates-and the
aspect of equal protection theory. If focus is placed on the substantive view the decisions can be viewed as compatible. Cessna, in
attempting to expand the illegitimate's right to support, is in line
with the rationale of Gomez v. Perez,09 although it reaches substantially further since Gomez dealt with a complete denial of the right
to support. There is support in other states for both sides on the
issue of time limitations in paternity actions. In Weaks v. Gallan"0
a New York court invalidated a similar two-year limitation on a
paternity suit, while the Colorado Supreme Court, in In re People
ex rel. L.B.,"1' found a five-year limitation to be rationally related
to the state's valid interest in deterring fraudulent claims.
Karas, on the other hand, is strongly supported by Labine,"2 and
decisions in other states which have also upheld strict formal requirements governing the right of an illegitimate to inherit from the
father."3 Indeed it could be argued that the United States Supreme
Court decisions exhibit a scheme which emphasizes concern for protecting basic and immediate sustenance of the illegitimatesupport payments, welfare or Social Security benefits, tort damages-while showing less solicitude for such contingent interests
as a right of inheritance. The Illinois decisions fit comfortably into
this allocation of interests.
However, reconciliation becomes problematical when focus is directed to the equal protection methodology used. Although it was
never directly articulated, Karas clearly applied the traditional twotiered approach, rejecting claims of suspect status for illegitimates
and upholding the rational relationship of the classification to each
state purpose found in the statute. Use of the permissive rational
basis test was the only way that a rational connection could be
found between a discrimination adversely affecting illegitimates
and the purpose of promoting family life. On the other hand, the
other state interests asserted-efficient probate administration and
109. 409 U.S. 535 (1973).
110. 61 Misc. 2d 681, 306 N.Y.S.2d 614 (Fam.Ct. 1969).
111. 498 P.2d 1157 (Colo. 1972).
112. See text accompanying notes 44 through 46 supra.
113. The Minnesota Supreme Court, for example, in In re Estate of Pakarinen, 287 Minn.
330, 178 N.W.2d 714 (1970), upheld a statutory requirement that an illegitimate, in order to
inherit from an intestate father, must produce an attested written declaration of paternity
made by the decedent. The Minnesota court noted that the provision did not exclude illegitimates as such, but only those who could not produce such a declaration. The requirement
was deemed intelligibly related to the purpose of the descent statutes-to give effect to the
presumed intent of an intestate-and to the need for reliable proof of paternity in order to
prevent fraudulent claims.
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prevention of fraudulent claims-are clearly furthered by barring
the illegitimate from inheritance. Thus "rationality scrutiny" would
not have helped the petitioner, further illustrating that the
strengthened rational basis test has only a minor effect in closing
the gap in the two-tiered method. "4
Cessna also employed the two-tiered approach, but with an apparent variation. The less stringent standard of review, on which the
court relied, appeared to be the strengthened rather than the traditional form of the rational basis test. In asserting that there was no
rational connection between the classification and the purpose
served by the statute, the court inspected in detail the relationship
of the means to those purposes. However, the strengthened rational
basis test, if properly applied, does not support the result reached
in Cessna. In fact, the two-year limitation does further the objectives of encouraging mothers to bring paternity actions early and
minimizing the possibility of fraud. A more stringent level of review-one which would demand stronger justification than a mere
rational relationship to a valid state interest-was theoretically necessary to invalidate this two-year statute of limitations.
The failures of current equal protection analysis are evident in
these opinions. Both accepted the two-tiered method as the governing mode of evaluation, and then each applied what it considered
to be the rational basis test. But one used the traditional, permissive
form while the other attempted to use the strengthened form, with
neither court apparently feeling the necessity or having the resources to explain why that particular standard was being accepted.
Here, then, is one aspect of the instability created by the Supreme
Court: it has permitted two versions under the same name to exist,
leaving a lower court free to adopt either approach, while claiming
to be using "the" rational basis standard, in order to give effect to
its own proclivities toward the challenged legislation. The seriousness of this particular problem is minimized, however, by the fact
noted above that the strengthened test, if properly applied, as it was
not in Cessna, is really not so strengthened after all, and will not
often create different results from those produced by the traditional
test.15
Another weakness in current equal protection analysis can be seen
in the failure of both Illinois courts, because they accepted at face
value the Supreme Court's expressed adherence to the two-tiered
method, to utilize analytical tools which that court has actually
114.
115.

See text accompanying notes 80 through 82 supra.
See text accompanying notes 80 through 82 and 114 supra.
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employed in illegitimacy cases. The two-year limitation on paternity actions does not appear to be susceptible to the conclusive presumption analysis used in Jiminez, because a time limit on a right
of action does not involve any presumption of one fact from another. '6 Thus, in the absence of suspect status characterization, the
Cessna court could have reached the same result only by balancing
the interests in the manner of Gomez.
However, in Karas, the court had at least two alternative approaches available which it did not consider. It could have engaged
in balancing of interests; in addition, the absolute bar to inheritance
by illegitimates in the absence of intermarriage by the parents-a
formal requirement for proof of paternity-could have been subjected to the conclusive presumption approach, under the theory
that the statute conclusively presumed that an illegitimate without
such proof was not the child of the decedent. The purpose of preventing fraudulent inheritance claims could surely be served by
means more finely tailored to the need for adequate proof and less
onerous to the child, who of course has little to say in whether his
natural parents marry or not. The rule is underinclusive because it
denies inheritance to children born illegitimate whose parents do
not marry but whose proof of the paternal relationship may be
equally convincing to that of illegitimate children whose parents do
marry.
WHY NOT SUSPECT STATUS FOR CLASSIFICATIONS BASED ON
ILLEGITIMACY?

The variegated theoretical dilemmas resulting from proliferation
of less-than-strict standards of review raises an obvious question:
why the Supreme Court has not avoided much of this analytical
agony by simply declaring illegitimacy a suspect classification? The
Supreme Court has skirted this question several times,"' and the
Karas opinion was able to avoid the merits of the issue by concluding that it lacked the authority to declare illegitimacy suspect because the Supreme Court had refrained from such a declaration." '
The Karas court did not discuss the fact that it could have done so
not as a matter of federal constitutional law but, just as it had done
for sex, under its power to interpret the equal protection provision
116. See text accompanying notes 62 through 64 supra.
117. In Jiminez v. Weinberger, 417 U.S. 628 (1974), the Court specifically stated that it
did not need to reach the question of suspect status. This evasion was facilitated by the use
of the conclusive presumption approach, which appears to be the equivalent of strict scrutiny.
118. In re Estate of Karas, 61 Ill.
2d 40, 51, 329 N.E.2d 234, 240 (1975).
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of the Illinois Constitution."'
It is not easy to comprehend why there has been such reluctance
to require that classifications imposing special burdens on illegitimates be subjected to strict scrutiny. Although the Court has not
authoritatively specified any formal criteria of suspect status, several principles have been gleaned from the ad hoc suspect classification decisions. 2 " Illegitimacy appears to fit those principles neatly.
Like race and national origin, it is a condition "determined solely
by accident of birth" and is "beyond the control of the child."' 2'
Clearly it is a status which "subjects the child to a stigma of inferi1 22
ority."
Indeed, illegitimates form the very type of politically weak minority subject to the vagaries of an unsympathetic majoritarian process
which the suspect classification was designed to protect.' 23 The judiciary has largely accepted a sporting theory of political activity,
under which "farmers, fishermen, truckers, billboard advertisers
and other economic groups" '24 must be content, in their struggles for
political advantage, to win some contests and lose others. But it has
also recognized that other groups, historically oppressed and politically ineffectual, cannot be fairly consigned to such gladiatorial
combat in the political arena. The suspect classification was created
as a species of judicial protection for such persons. It is difficult to
justify treatment by courts of illegitimates in a fashion more like the
former than the latter.
When consideration is given to this fundamental policy underlying the suspect concept, a stronger argument can even be made for
making illegitimacy suspect than for according sex classifications
that characterization. Women have demonstrated the ability to bat119. Id. at 54, 329 N.E.2d at 241. See text accompanying notes 97 and 98 supra.
120. See discussion in Wilkinson, supra note 35, at 980. In addition to the classic but
vague characterization of a suspect classification as a "discrete and insular minority," United
States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938), the plurality opinion in Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973), suggested three other criteria: that members of the
class "suffer from immutable characteristics determined solely by accident of birth"; that
they "have suffered historical vilification"; and that the class, largely because of past discrimination, lacks effective political power and redress.
In Jiminez v. Weinberger, 417 U.S. 628, 631 (1974), the criteria discussed included the
requirement that the class be differentiated by a condition "determined solely by birth"
which is "beyond the control of the children" and which "subjects the children to a stigma
of inferiority."
121. Jiminez v. Weinberger, 417 U.S. 628, 631 (1974).
122. Id.
123. See Wilkinson, supra note 35, at 978; BICKEL, supra note 33, at 226; Shaman, supra
note 35, at 153; and Cox, supra note 33, at 9.
124. BICKEL, supra note 33, at 227.
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tle for equal rights with relative fearlessness in the political sphere.
Illegitirnates, for obvious reasons, would be reluctant to do so. Ironically, there can be little doubt that the political efficacy of women's
rights groups was largely instrumental in forcing sex- discrimination
to be specifically prohibited in the Illinois Constitution. This specific prohibition in turn was the basis for the Illinois Supreme
Court's declaration that sex is a suspect classification. 2 5 To deny
suspect status for illegitimates because they lack the political power
to secure specific protection in the Illinois Constitution is to turn the
entire concept of the suspect category on its head. The court's decision in Karas to opt for the status quo is thus highly vulnerable.
Illegitimacy would also seem to have a better claim to suspect
status than alienage. Illegitimates are completely powerless to alter
their condition. Aliens, on the other hand, are often present in this
country of their own volition; they also have the opportunity to
change their status by becoming citizens.'2 6
Recognition of the policy foundation of the suspect classification
also compels another look at the high statistical correlation of race
and poverty with illegitimacy.'27 The Karas court misused the statistical evidence by seeing its relevance only in support of a theory
that suspect status should be accorded because discrimination
against illegitimates is in reality discrimination in disguise against
blacks. 2 ' It is not necessary to make that leap in order to give weight
to the statistical correlation. Whether or not discrimination against
illegitimates is disguised discrimination against blacks (the history
of illegitimacy laws in the Anglo-American system would suggest
otherwise), the statistical evidence is highly corroborative of the
assertion that illegitimates are handicapped in the political marketplace and for that reason should be protected by the suspect classification.
In view of the strong argument in favor of characterizing
illegitimacy of birth as a suspect classification, the failure of the
courts to do so can probably be traced to fear of certain consequences. Because strict scrutiny has meant virtually automatic in125. See text accompanying notes 97 and 98 supra.
126. Wilkinson, supra note 35, at 980.
127. Bastard Finds His Father, supro note 43, at 109 n.22. Estimates made in 1965 indicated that approximately 26 per cent of all non-white births were out-of-wedlock, compared
with four per cent of white births. In addition, 70 per cent of illegitimate white children are
adopted, compared to only three-to-five per cent of non-white illegitimate children. Thus,
even considering the fact that non-whites constitute a minority of the population, discriminatory laws do in fact fall disproportionately on non-white children. Significantly more nonwhite than white children are victimized by these laws.
128. See text accompanying note 96 supra.
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validation,'25 the jurisprudence of compelling state interests is not
well developed. The courts perhaps feel trepidation in defining when
necessity ends and excessive burden begins in a statute of limitations on paternity actions; or in proclaiming just what degree of
proof, and no more, a state may require before allowing an illegiti3
mate to inherit from a putative father.'
However, where application of the apparent principles of the suspect concept produces such a clear answer, the courts should be
willing to push aside fear of the consequences. Over 30 years ago the
Supreme Court declared that "distinctions between citizens solely
because of their ancestry are by their very nature odious to a free
people whose institutions are founded upon the doctrine of equality."' 3 ' In Weber the Court used similarly strong language in commenting on distinctions based on legitimacy of birth:
. . . [limposing disabilities on the illegitimate child is contrary
to the basic concept of our system that legal burdens should bear
some relationship to individual responsibility or wrongdoing. Obviously, no child is responsible for his birth and penalizing the
illegitimate child is an ineffectual-as well as unjust-way of de32
terring the parent.'
From such language it would seem but a natural step to say that
any burdens placed on the illegitimate should be no more onerous
than necessary to effectuate a compelling state interest.
Until the courts are willing to test such burdens against the demands of strict scrutiny, decisions such as Labine and Karas will
continue to leave a residue of apparent injustice. It does not fit
accepted notions of fairness to deny the right of inheritance to illegitimates-regardless of the strength of the proof of paternity-because the child cannot produce some formal proof requirement, such as subsequent intermarriage or acknowledgment under
oath, over which he has no control. Although the Court has been
accused of espousing an "ideology of unrestrained egalitarianism,"' 33 in fact it has merely accepted into the framework of constitutional law the limited, widely accepted notion of equality of opportunity.' 34 One type of opportunity embedded in our legal system
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
ing).
134.

See text accompanying note 31 supra.
Note, Illegitimacy and Equal Protection, 49 N.Y.U. L. REV. 479, 530 (1974).
Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 100 (1943).
Weber v. Aetna Casualty and Surety Co., 406 U.S. 164, 175 (1972).
Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 686 (1966) (Harlan, J., dissentWilkinson, supra note 35, at 984.
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is the opportunity to inherit. It may well be true that the right of
inheritance and equality of opportunity are inconsistent concepts,
for the former, by giving some an initial advantage in the race for
material rewards, undermines the latter. But it is hardly fair play
to bring negative feelings about the windfall of inheritance into
operation only against illegitimates. So long as inheritance is recognized in this society, the opportunity for illegitimate children to
inherit equally with legitimate children should be maximized.
It is possible to do this and still take cognizance of society's need
to prevent fraudulent claims without demanding formal requirements of proof.'3 ' However, unwillingness to characterize illegitimacy as a suspect classification has left the courts without a recognized principle which would guarantee that illegitimates are burdened no more than necessary. Without such a principle, excessively discriminatory statutes will not disappear.
THE

ROOT

OF THE CONFUSION IN EQUAL PROTECTION ANALYSIS:

DEFINING THE COURT'S PROPER ROLE IN THE CONSTITUTIONAL SYSTEM

There is limited utility in simply diagnosing the state of confusion
in equal protection analysis, decrying its existence and exhorting
the courts, especially the Supreme Court, to mend their ways. Confusion is the inevitable by-product when a particular pattern of
thinking-here, the two-tiered method-is dislodged. Indeed, if necessity is the mother of invention, we should welcome the confusion
as a necessary condition for formulating a new and more acceptable
method of applying the equal protection clause. The best hope for
generating a workable and theoretically sound approach lies in isolating the sources of confusion.
This uncertainty is not merely the product of judicial obtuseness
or stubbornness. A common thread runs through the Supreme
Court's desire to avoid creating new suspect categories and its unwillingness to adopt a balancing approach to equal protection. Both
135. The Uniform Probate Code would permit illegitimate children to inherit from intestate fathers so long as the claim were supported by "clear and convincing proof." UPC § 2109. This proof requirement, because it is consistent with proof requirements generally in the
probate area, would probably be acceptable under the strict scrutiny standard. See Note, 69
MICH. L. REV. 112 (1970).
Professor Krause argues that it is "absurd to argue that because there is no proof in some
cases, no obligation [on the father or on his estate] should be imposed in cases where there
is proof." Bastard Finds His Father, supra note 43, at 103. He also argues that the factual
impossibility of perfect equality for illegitimates is no excuse for failing to provide the degree
of equality which the law can effectively furnish. He asserts that the experience in Arizona
and Oregon demonstrates that the goal of legal equality can be largely achieved. Equal
Protection for the Illegitimate, supra note 6, at 505.
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courses would tend to push the Court toward a degree of judicial
activism which it is unsure it should properly assume. Even though
it is recognized that Supreme Court behavior inevitably involves
both judicial and political modes of decision-making,"'3 there is wide
agreement among constitutional scholars that the Court should
avoid encroaching on those matters which are properly within the
sphere of the majoritarian process.'37 Thus, it is asserted that some
interests-particularly those involving business and economic
power-are adequately represented in the political process and have
no need for judicial protection.'
Moreover, some matters, especially those involving difficult compromises of numerous conflicting
interests, can actually be solved more rationally in the legislatures,
which operate on the principle of compromise and, unlike the
courts, have the research capability to reach acceptable resolutions.
It is this concern for its proper role which highlights the Court's
reluctance to create new suspect classifications or to embrace an
explicit balancing test. A great number of groupings which have
been subject to discrimination by the majority might have a claim
to suspect status. 39 The Court might have difficulty deciding where
to re-draw this line once the present one is breached.
Balancing tests tend to be disfavored because of the difficulty in
specifically defining the interests which should be weighed on the
opposite sides of the scale. One side can become weighted to such
an extent that the Court almost invariably will be forced to trespass
on areas properly reserved to the legislature. Where legislation
touches fundamental rights or involves suspect classifications, the
inevitability of judicial review is accepted as a limitation on the
majoritarian process. However, the scale can also be weighted as it
was in the era of substantive due process, which was a balance-ofinterests test in which one side became weighted with laissez-faire
economic theory.4 0 Under substantive due process, any legislation
which limited freedom of contract was likely to be invalidated by
the Court, in direct conflict with the political choices made in the
136. KURLAND, POLITICS. THE CONSTITUTION AND THE WARREN COURT 2 (1970) [hereinafter
cited as KURLAND]. See also Cox, supra note 33, at 13-16.
137. See Cox. supra note 33, at 13-16; BICKEL, supra note 33, at 113; KURLAND, supra note
136, at xxii; B. SCHWARTZ, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 207-20 (1955) [hereinafter cited as
SCHWARTZJ.

138. Cox, supra note 33, at 9; BICKEL, supra note 33, at 226.
139. The concept of suspect category might also be applied to homosexuals, the aged, exfelons, the mentally ill. Wilkinson, supra note 35, at 982. No doubt the Court would prefer
to delay facing these questions.
140. SCHWARTZ, supra note 137, at 208-10.
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majoritarian process. 4 '
The institutional crisis which the excesses of substantive due process brought forth during the New Deal is still fresh in the minds of
many who wish to see the Court's opinions continue to command
the respect of the public.' The Court's reluctance to adopt an explicit balancing process and its inability to articulate another
method to replace the two-tiered approach can only be understood
against this backdrop. The Court appears to be seeking a synthesis
between Lochnerian activism and post-Lochnerian restraint which
will carve out a sphere of proper judicial activity.' We may plead
for a restatement of equal protection analysis, but it probably will
not occur until the limits of that sphere can be adequately defined.
Despite the importance of recognizing the underlying reasons for
the Court's paralysis, it is less than satisfying simply to leave on a
note of apology for the confusion which exists. Allowing for justification does not change the fact that a condition exists which is likely
to lead to disparate results in similar cases. A unitary, flexible balancing process cannot be expected in equal protection cases, for the
Court clearly wishes to retain the deferential balance it has struck
in the traditional rational basis test when dealing with matters of
business and economy. It also has a workable method in strict scrutiny when faced with fundamental rights and suspect classifications. Perhaps, though, by maintaining these extremes, it could
engage in balancing per se in the intermediate regions without inviting the role conflict which threatened the integrity of the Court four
decades ago. Certain kinds of classifications, such as illegitimacy
and sex, could simply be recognized as exceptions which should be
evaluated outside the two-tiered method.
CONCLUSION

'

Analysis of Supreme Court decisions which have dramatically
improved the legal status of illegitimates reveals significant erosion
in the two-tiered method of equal protection analysis. Although the
Court has asserted that the two-tiered approach is still the operative
procedure, at least three different "sub-strict" levels of review can
be identified. It has even engaged in balancing the seriousness of the
burden imposed by the classification against the importance of the
141. Id.
142. Cox, supra note 33, at 13.
143. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), in which a state law setting maximum
working hours was invalidated because it impinged on freedom of contract, is usually considered to be the archetypal substantive due process case.
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state interest it is intended to serve; it has only done this, however,
in an abrupt per curiam opinion which withheld explicit endorsement of such a process.
Two recent Illinois cases, In re Estate of Karas'" and Cessna v.
Montgomery, " ' reveal the difficulties which face those courts which
must try to follow the Supreme Court in the area of equal protection. The United States Supreme Court's stated adherence to the
two-tiered method will discourage use by some of new analytical
tools which that Court has actually employed. On the other hand,
no secure principles have emerged to guide the lower courts in
applying these additional techniques. The result is likely to be a
degree of semi-anarchy-unlike decisions in like cases-until the
uncertainty is dispelled.
It should be recognized, however, that the confusion which exists
is due to genuine and serious policy conflicts which permit no easy
resolution. The Court has been unwilling to expand the suspect
classification category, even though, had it done so, considerably
less distortion of the two-tiered method would have occurred. It has
also been unwilling to adopt explicitly a balancing process. The
apparent reason for reluctance to take either of these steps is the
fear that powerful pressures in the direction of greater judicial activism might be unleashed: "Once loosed," observed one commentator, "the idea of equality is not easily cabined."118 Lacking a clear
perception of where the outer limits of judicial activism would be
drawn under a new methodology, the Court might be pushed into
areas of decision-making which the rise and fall of substantive due
process have taught should be left to the legislature.
Yet the Court has also been unwilling to let a broad equal protection methodology-the two-tiered system-subjugate another equal
protection principle which is indeed more specific to the question
of illegitimacy: that the law should minimize burdens placed on
persons due to a condition of their birth. Although on superficial
inspection the illegitimacy decisions appear to apply free-floating
notions of justice-perhaps an "ideology of egalitarianism"-in fact
the Court has been confronted with conflicting principles of constitutional law and has chosen the more particular over the more general.
In choosing this course the Court's desire to do justice has outrun
its ability to maintain analytical consistency. Thus, it has created
144.
145.
146.

61 111. 2d 40, 329 N.E.2d 234 (1975).
28 Ill.
App. 3d 887, 329 N.E.2d 861 (1975).
Cox, supra note 33, at 6.
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an uncertain, unstable condition in the methodology of equal protection review. In the interregnum of uncertainty between the old
and the new, it is important for the lower courts to realize that the
two-tiered method is no longer the iron-clad system it was, and that
in certain situations new tools are available. Their discreet application is more likely to achieve the ultimate aims of the law than rigid
adherence to a dying system.
A permanent stabilization of equal protection methodology, however, must come from the Supreme Court. Some of the stresses on
the traditional mode of analysis could be removed by the simple
expedient of finally declaring illegitimacy to be a suspect classification. But if this is not done, some new approach-perhaps balancing
only between the fixed extremes of the two-tiered method-must
eventually be adopted.
STEPHEN K. WEBER

